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STATE MANAGEMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
PART TWO: A CONTINUING EVALUATION OF THE
MICHIGAN EXPERIENCEt
Geoffrey J. Lanning*
In Part One of this article,' the author outlined the scope and
character of Michigan's environmental problems and suggested some
of the factors underlying the state's weak and bureaucratic decisionmaking process. Part Two concludes the author's analysis of the
fundamental obstacles to effective environmental decisionmaking in
Michigan, and Part Three will contain recommendations for reform.
VI. INADEQUATE OR INEFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF
MICHIGAN'S ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND OBLIGATIONS

A failure to implement or to adequately enforce environmental laws
may be due to a lack of personnel and resources. It may also be due
to oversight or incompetence, or to deliberate omissions resulting from
the bureaucracy's response to special interest pressures. However, the
most fundamental factor is the absence of an integrated approach to
environmental planning.
An illustration of the interplay of some of these characteristics is
provided by the difficulties that have been encountered in implementing Michigan's Wilderness and Natural Areas Act of 1972.2 By the
end of 1973, none of the thirty-one areas proposed by citizens under
the Act had been designated as natural areas. A good part of this delay
has been due to the Department of Natural Resources' (DNR)
insistence on using only two or three part-time persons from its Lansing
staff to serve on the Wilderness and Natural Areas Advisory Board.
Another major cause is DNR's domination by fish and game profes-

tThis article is a condensation by the Journal of a more extensive unpublished work by
Professor Geoffrey Lanning. Professor Lanning's analysis differs from this article in the
former's broader scope and more detailed discussion of the environmental decisionmaking
process in Michigan. The analysis by Professor Lanning is on file with the author at Wayne
State University Law School.
*Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B., 1939; LL.B., 1942, Harvard University.
I Lanning; State Management of the Environment-Part One: An Evaluation of the
Michigan Experience, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 286 (1975).
2 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 322.751-.763 (Supp. 1974).
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sionals who place a low priority on wilderness concerns. 3 Furthermore,
DNR's wildlife division generally resists implementing wilderness and
natural areas laws because it has not been authorized to conduct game
research studies in natural geographic areas. 4 Factors such as these
combined to produce DNR's initial opposition to the Sleeping Bear
Dunes National Lakeshore wilderness proposals of the United States
Park Service.5 Ultimately, the Michigan Natural Resources Council
(NRC) ordered DNR to reconsider its firm position that the area
offered a fine opportunity for "wild life management." 6 If, as in many
of the situations previously discussed,' the DNR staff views itself as a
buffer for productivity interests, the burden of implementing the
Wilderness and Natural Areas Act will continue to rest on individual
citizens. Rather than requiring industry to show that economic activity
will not cause undue harm, this attitude guarantees that the public will
continue to shoulder the risks of environmentally detrimental activities.
The activities of the Michigan Air Pollution Control Commission
(MAPCC) and of its chief field agency, the Wayne County Air Pollution Control Division (WAPCD) demonstrate the effects of proindustry bias on the implementation of environmental laws. 8 Several
studies, 9 including those undertaken by the University of Michigan
Law School' 0 and School of Natural Resources,11 have found
WAPCD's emphasis to be on industrial interests. The tactic of "conference, conciliation, and persuasion" employed by the agencies,
ostensibly as the most effective way to deal with violations of the
law, 1 2 amounts to an abandonment of enforcement. The tactic favors
industry, which consequently ignores environmental laws without fear
of WAPCD-initiated litigation.' 3 While the voluntary-compliance approach was initially dictated by the industry-inspired language of the

3 See interviews on file with author which support this view of the Department of Natural
Resources' attitude.
4 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 322.751-.763 (Supp. 1974).
5 North Woods Call, July 24, 1974, at 4; id., Aug. 14, 1974, at 1, 5.
6 North Woods Call, Aug. 14, 1974, at 1, 5.
7 See generally notes 118-136 and accompanying text in PART ONE of this article.
I See note 161 and accompanying text in PART ONE of this article.
9 Roller, Michigan Air Pollution Controls: Legislative Efforts at Reform, 19 WAYNE L.
REV. 89, 100-01, 123-24 (1972).
'0 STUDY GROUP REPORT ON THE WAPCD 19 (1971) (on file with the Environmental Law
Society of the Univerity of Michigan Law School) [hereinafter cited as STUDY GROUP
REPORT].

1 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY IN RIVER ROUGE 24, 28 (1972) (prepared by Dr. James Swan
of the University of Michigan School of Natural Resources) [hereinafter cited as RIVER
ROUGE STUDY].
12 STUDY GROUP REPORT,

17.
"3See id.

supra note 10, at 51-53; RIVER ROUGE STUDY, supra note 11,
at
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1967 Michigan Air Pollution Act, 4 it has persisted in the enforcement
practices of the air pollution control bureaucracy.15 The previously
discussed examples of the Hillsdale Foundry,' 6 the Northern Reduction Company, 7 and Peerless Cement' s demonstrate the reluctance
with which MAPCC has acted in enforcing environmental obligations.
Effective implementation of environmental policy is unlikely in the
face of this timorous approach to enforcement.
A further example of such shortcomings is MAPCC's air pollution
implementation plan19 under the 1970 National Environmental Policy
Act.2" The plan concluded that the automobile is not a primary source
of air pollution in Michigan, although auto emissions are a major
factor in most other industrial states.2 MAPCC claimed to offer an air
pollution plan without considering transportation patterns and land
use planning.
The failures of Michigan's air pollution control planning are representative of the impact of many state environmental laws which
threaten major productivity interests. These results stem from the
unresponsiveness of Michigan decisionmaking to environmental protection problems. Similar results may be ascribed to the activities of
the Water Resources Commission (WRC). The Michigan Water
Resources Commission Act, 22 prior to its amendments in 197223 and
1973,24 was a clearly inadequate law, and its administration was
equally ineffective.25 The federal government coerced the reluctant
Michigan legislature into adopting amendments by employing the not
very subtle threat that the federal government would take over
administration of water quality control under the 1972 Federal Water
Control Act 26 (FWPCA) unless Michigan improved its law and
14

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 336.18 (1974).

IS See note 12 supra.

16 See, e.g., Detroit Free Press, June 6, 1974, at IA, col. 6; part III of PART ONE of this
article.
1 See, e.g., Sax & Conner, Michigan'sEnvironmentalProtectionAct of 1970: A Progress
Report, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1003 (1972). See part Ill of PART ONE of this article.
"IDetroit News, July 30, 1972, at 4B, col. I. See part III of PART ONE of this article.
19 Proposed Implementation Plan for the Control of Suspended Particulates, Sulphur
Oxides, Carbon Monoxide, Hydrocarbons, Nitrogen Oxides, and Photochemical Oxidants
in the State of Michigan (November, 1971); Final Implementation Plan for the Control of
Suspended Particulates in the-State of Michigan (January, 1972).
20 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
21 The Federal Environment Protection Agency supported Michigan's claim that automobile emissions are not a serious air pollution problem in Michigan. See Detroit News,
Aug. 14, 1974, at 21A.
22 MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.1 et seq. (1967).
23 No. 159, [1972] Mich. Pub. Acts 256; No. 293, [1972] Mich. Pub. Acts 896.
24 No. 3, [1973] Mich. Pub. Acts.
25 See part V in PART ONE of this article.
26 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (Supp. 1972). 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (Supp. 1972) reserves power in
the federal government to control state water pollution in the absence of effective state
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administration. Michigan had revealed no comprehensive plan for
dealing with water management but instead dealt with polluters on an
ad hoc basis.17 Since water management is one area in which the importance of integrated planning is widely recognized as a necessary
tool of management,2" Michigan's failure to plan in this area can be
viewed as a failure to implement the laws as well. Although the
FWCPA now requires states to adopt comprehensive water management plans,29 there is no evidence that Michigan has begun planning
in this area.

30

The Office of the Attorney General is one organ that is in a position
to take the general overview needed for adequate environmental
protection. The Attorney General has a statewide role, particularly
with respect to enforcement of the legislative duty to protect the
environment mandated by the Michigan Constitution of 1963.31 While
the Office has an organizational independence, it has not realized its
full potential in the interests of environmental protection, largely
32
because of severe shortages of funds, staff, and other vital resources.
Jurisdictional problems with local prosecutors and the dearth of legal
33
counsel for particular agencies further exacerbate the problem.
Thus, despite the differences between the Attorney General's Office
and conventional environmental agencies, the Office can function no
better than the agencies.
Unfortunately, the consequences of inadequate enforcement by the
Attorney General can be more harmful than poor administration by
other agencies, especially in the context of a lack of executive leadership. Barring motivation from the Governor, initiative is unlikely to
originate below. The mercury crisis of 1970 provides an apt
illustration.
A Department of Natural Resources (DNR) official learned on
February 11, 1970, of a Canadian discovery that all links in the food
chain were threatened with deadly mercury poisoning due to mercury
discharges into bodies of water such as Lake St. Clair. 4 The official
activity. But see Note, Michigan Water Resources Commission Act Amendments: A Response to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 7 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 455, 461 (1974) [hereinafter cited as WRC Note]. The author notes that the Michigan
legislature acted out of fear that the federal government would pre-empt state water quality
control. Id. at 461.
2" See WRC Note, supra note 26, at 478.
28 See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Hines, Controlling Industrial Water
Pollution: Color the Problem Green, 9 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 553, 588 (1968).
29 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e) (Supp. 1972).
30 See note 27 supra.
3' MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 52.
2 WRC Note, supra note 26, at 476-77; Note, The Role of the MichiganAttorney General
in Consumer and Environmental Protection, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1053-56 (1974).
33 Id.
3' Detroit News, Apr. 26, 1970, at 10B.
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apparently made none of this public, 35 and, as a consequence, the
Michigan Department of Agriculture did not learn of this problem
until March 27, 1970. Another two weeks passed without completion
of vital tests to determine the safety of Michigan fish for human
consumption. The head of the Michigan Department of Agriculture
explained, "No one had told him to work his chemists overtime." The
Governor's response was that fishing could continue, but, paradoxically, that the fish should not be eaten. The Governor also said on April
3, 1970, that the Michigan sports fishery would not be curtailed. 6
Four days later, the Governor banned all sports and commercial
fishing in Lake St. Clair,37 and the Canadian government followed
suit.

38

The state's continuing failure to adopt adequate precautions with
respect to the use of toxic substances and its eager promotion of
nuclear construction do not generate confidence that the bureaucratic
reaction to future serious accidents will be any more competent or
coherent than it was when the mercury crisis arose, nor that the public
interest and safety will be given adequate consideration.
Once again, Michigan's lack of executive leadership has been a
significant ingredient in the inadequacies of its enforcement efforts.
The Governor has frequently supported environmental measures and
then backed away when special interest resistance arose in the
Legislature. Land use planning, which remains in a state of confusion
in Michigan,39 provides an excellent example. The Governor withdrew
his support from an enlightened proposal that might have offered a
workable land use planning program because the real estate lobby had
launched a massive scare program.4" He later offered verbal endorse4
ment but made no bona fide effort to use his political influence. '
Similarly, as discussed earlier,4 2 the Governor took a bold step forward
by issuing an executive order that would have given the Michigan
Environmental Review Board (MERB) a veto on environmentally

31 He seems to follow his earlier advice about the grave dangers inherent in public
participation in environmental decisionmaking. See notes 44-46 and accompanying text in
PART ONE of this article. The same high official denied federal EPA findings that small
mercury discharges were continuing into Southeastern Michigan sewer systems. Detroit
Free Press, June 5, 1970, at 3A, col. 5.
11 Detroit News, Apr. 26, 1970, at 10B.
3, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1970, at 40C, col. 4.
a8 Detroit Free Press, Apr. 8, 1970, at 3A, col. 4.
3' As long as Michigan land owners believe that ownership carries with it the right to do as
they wish with the land, rational use of Michigan's land resources remains a remote possibility. See notes 47-51 and accompanying text infra.
40 Detroit Free Press, Feb. 11, 1972, at 3A, col. 5; id., May 3, 1974, at 8A, col. 1.
4, See notes 97, 100-107, and 109 and accompanying text infra.
42 See notes 93-100 and accompanying text in PART ONE of this article.
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adverse activities of the big state agencies.4 3 However, when the
bureaucrats who headed those agencies began to apply pressure on the
Legislature, 44 the Governor recanted.
The Governor also supported a long overdue reorganization of
environmental agencies in Michigan that would have vested considerable authority in DNR. Once again, however, the Governor
reconsidered when the special interests backing other agencies
protested their potential loss of power and influence. 45 After recently
setting up a Task Force on Environmental Education, the Governor
withdrew its necessary budgetary support. Given the attitude of the
leader, it does not seem surprising that lower level officials hesitate to
support public environmental objectives.
The major thrust of this article-that the overall character of
Michigan's environmental decision process, including the performance
of its administrative agencies, makes it inadequately responsive to
Michigan's public environmental needs-remains at odds with the
simplistic view taken by trial lawyers who dominated, and perhaps
continue to dominate, the environmental movement. These practitioners seem to think that all one needs to do is "to sue the hell out of the
bastards. ' 46 This philosophy disregards the limited scope of most
litigation and the inability of courts to handle an integrated problem
such as the environment, save at the fringes. It also ignores the fact
that courts have no real political accountability, a major objection to
their making fundamental policy in a democracy. Even the occasional
elections to which some judges are subject do not turn upon nor affect
this lack of political accountability. Whether described as a "citizens'
suit" or otherwise, litigation is still only one element of the far broader
decisionmaking process. 7
43 See notes 94-95 and accompanying text in PART ONE of this article.
44 See notes 97-98 and accompanying text in PART ONE of this article.
45 Exec. Orders 1973-2, Jan. 11, 1973, 1973-2a, Mar. 13, 1973. See also Detroit Free Press,

Mar. 8, 1973, at 13A, col. 3; notes 40-42 and accompanying text supra.
46 For an example of the orientation of a leading environmentalist toward material incentives, see Roe, The Second Battle of Gettysburg, 2 ENVIR. AFFAIRS 16, 28-29, 31, 44-45
(1972); Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg, 3 E.R.C. 1270 (C.P. Pa. 1970).
17 A fairly typical argument against citizen suit legislation is that it would result in a more
congested court docket. However, this has.clearly not occurred in Michigan. See generally
Sax & Conner, supra note 17, at 1007. There is, however, a more basic objection to excessive
reliance upon citizen suits as a path to improved environmental protection: litigation is ad hoc
for problems which require broad environmental management. For further commentary on
the citizen suit, see, e.g., Hanks & Hanks, An EnvironmentalBill of Rights: The Citizen Suit
and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 2 ENVIR. L. REP. 147 (1971); Hatch,
Massachusetts and Michigan: Two States With an Answer, 6 LINC. L. REV. 119 (1971);
Lohrman, The Environmental Lawsuit: Traditional Doctrines and Evolving Theories to
ControlPollution, 2 ENVIR. L. REP. 199 (1971); McGregor, PrivateEnforcement ofEnvironmental Law: An Analysis of the Massachusetts Citizen Suit Statute, I ENVIR. AFFAIRS 606
(1971); Sax & DiMento, Environmental Citizens Suits: Three Years' Experience Under the
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Still, litigation may be useful in improving the enforcement of
individual environmental obligations. An interesting recent example
involves a citizens' suit to prohibit the dumping of fill into a five-acre
swamp on Walnut Lake in lower Michigan on the grounds that the
swamp serves as a natural filter to maintain clean lake water. Although
this development would seem to violate several state environmental
laws, DNR's Hydrologic Survey gave the swamp owners permission to
fill the swamp. The Hydrologic Survey claimed that it had no jurisdiction because the area to be filled would be above the lake's high
water mark.4" But if the Hydrologic Survey had desired to enforce
environmental protection, it could have used the Michigan Environmental Protection Act 49 to obtain judicial action. After the court acted
to protect the swamp,5 ° the Hydrologic Survey suddenly decided that
its first finding had not been based upon a full survey of Walnut Lake.
The Survey subsequently discovered that the fill had violated the
51
Inland Lakes and Streams Act.

VII.

INADEQUATE PLANNING AND INAPPROPRIATE
PERSPECTIVES

The environmental crisis is, among other things, a product of narrowness of outlook. It signifies a failure to appreciate that everything
about the human and the natural environment is closely interrelated
and that man cannot continue to expand productivity without some
consideration of its effects. Michigan has set out upon an unfocused
environmental course, and the consequence of such haphazard pursuit
Michigan Environmental Protection Act, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1974); Note: The Minnesota
Environmental Rights Act, 56 MINN. L. REV. 575 (1972); Note, State Legislation to Grant
Standing: Questions, Answers and Alternatives, 2 ENVIR. L. REP. 42 (1971).
The standing requirement was once a formidable barrier to effective utilization of the
courts, but recent decisions and legislation have substantially improved the situation. See
Albert, Standing to Challenge AdministrativeAction: An Inadequate Surrogatefor Claim
for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974); Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REV. 633 (1971);
Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-TowardLegal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S.
CALIF. L. REV. 450(1973); Comment, JudicialReview ofAgency Action: The Unsettled Law
of Standing, 69 MICH. L. REV. 540 (1971).

While standing barriers have been substantially overcome, access to the courts is still
limited by decisions such as Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) and Zahn v.
International Paper, 414 U.S. 291 (1973), denying class actions as a practical matter in many
cases. See Note, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 359 (1973); Note, 20 WAYNE L. REV. 215 (1973); Note,
Managing the Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87 HARV. L. REV. 426
(1973).
48 Detroit News, Sept. 25, 1974, at IA, col. 2; id., Sept. 26, 1974, at I B, col. 2; id., Sept. 28,
1974, at 7A, col. 4; id., Oct. 1, 1974, at 8D; id., Oct. 24, 1974, at 2B, col. 3.
49 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1201 er seq. tsupp. 1970).
50 Order of September, 1974 [further information not currently available].
5' MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 281.951 et seq. (Supp. 1974). See note 48 and accompanying
text supra.
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is -that the average person is now threatened by extraordinary dangers
that cannot be forestalled by hastily improvised measures.
One of the fundamental characteristics of this failure to visualize
environmental issues in an integrated fashion is the ad hoc approach
taken under the Michigan laws to the handling of most environmental
difficulties. 52 This approach stemmed largely from the partial one-onone approach of market economics and traditional legal doctrine which
we have called "Nuisance-Internalization." In this part, the underlying
aspects of these approaches are examined.
A. The Absence of an Integrated Overview
Management of the environment demands rationality of planning
and foresight, and, as the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA)5 3 states, "a systematic, inter-disciplinary approach which will
insure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences."
The difficulties the author encountered in drafting Michigan legislation to deal with the handling of toxic substances such as mercury
provides a case in point.54 The state agencies dealing with air pollution,
water pollution, and solid waste face different environmental problems
separately. On the other hand, mercury can permeate all aspects of
the environment. The combustion of mercury produces air pollution.
Its burial pollutes the soil or degrades surface or underground waters.
Since the state of Michigan lacks an integrated environmental agency,
it is difficult to handle the mercury problem in a unified manner. Splitting up these problems among the agencies thus prevents effective
55
solutions.
The state's administration of major environmental problems such as
air pollution has suffered in a comparable way from the failure of
individual state agencies to adopt integrated approaches. The individualistic, productivity-oriented interests that helped to quash efforts
52 See part VI supra.

53 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A) (1970).
Jula, Environmental Aspects of Heavy Metal Toxicity, 1 ENVIR. AFFAIRS 74 (1970);
Lanning, Michigan Toxic Material Legislation (Draft and Comments 1972) (on file with
author at Wayne State University Law School).
11 In January, 1973, the Governor, in Executive Order 1973-2, designated DNR as the
agency responsible for environmental matters. He also abolished the Interim Office on Land
Use within the Governor's office and transferred it to DNR. However, the legislature was not
prepared to accept all of this, particularly the shifts of the drainage function and the
downgrading of MAPCC. Therefore, the Governor modified his original executive order, left
the drainage functions in the Agriculture Department, and left MAPCC with a more independent status. Executive Order 1973-2a. See also testimony of the author before the House
Conservation and Recreation Committee, 75th Legis., Reg. Sess. (1972), as to the form a
possible environmental reorganization should take (on file with author at Wayne State
University Law School).

"
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to achieve statewide land use planning5" continue to support only
sporadic incentive devices to stem environmental hazards.
Unfortunately, however, the narrowness of vision is not restricted
to industrial or anti-environmental interests. For every environmental
activist who comprehends the factors that shape the protection of
Michigan's environment, there exists a person who limits his or her
view of the problem to bottle caps, recycling, or to a vanishing species.
While these goals are clearly desirable, it is of greater import that the
resources of the environmental movement are limited and that the
movement can no longer afford to dissipate its energies on any but the
broader, more fundamental problems.
Nevertheless, the environmental movement has frequently concentrated its few resources and energies on relatively unimportant
legislation such as the Bottle Bill, H.B. 4926,' 7 or the bill to reform
MAPCC, H.B. 4260,18 instead of working toward a unified environmental agency, a realistic environmental review power,"9 or comprehensive land use planning. Furthermore, the movement spent a good
deal of its energy in obtaining the enactment of a citizens' suit law,
the Environmental Protection Act of 1970. 60 This law has provided
some useful access to the courts, and it has made it easier for politically
weak environmental and public interests to be heard. 61 But citizen
suits cannot save the environment. More basic organizational improvements are needed.
B. The Absence of Planning
The first step in establishing an adequate environmental program
would appear to be the drafting of an overall plan along with a
reordering of priorities. This has never been done by the Michigan
government. The Governor's Council on Environmental Quality, in its
1969 Report,6 2 provided a loose listing of topics which someone may
56 See notes 95-115 and accompanying text infra.

5' 75th Legis., Reg. Sess. (1972). Apparently this bill did not emerge from committee.
Earth Beat, May 3, 1974, at 1.
58 75th Legis., Reg. Sess. (1972). H.B. 4260 was ultimately enacted in a drastically
modified and weakened form. No. 257 [1972] Mich. Pub. Acts 637. Few of the existing
deficiencies in the air pollution control laws were corrected. See also Irwin, Michigan Air
Pollution Control: A Case Study, 4 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 23 (1970).
11 See note 55 and accompanying text supra, as to the need for a unified environmental
agency; see notes 96-103 and accompanying text in PART ONE of this article, dealing with the
effort to provide adequate administrative environmental review in Michigan (MERB).
60 No. 127 [1970] Mich. Pub. Acts 390. See Note, Michigan EnvironmentalProtectionAct
of 1970, 4 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 121 (1970); Note, Michigan EnvironmentalProtectionAct,
4 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 358 (1970).
61 Sax & Conner, supra note 17, at 1005.
62 GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY IN MICHIGAN (Feb.,
1970).
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have thought deserved priority, but there is no evidence that these
problems had been analyzed or arranged in any meaningful way.
In sharp contrast are states such as Maryland, which requires its
public utility agency to prepare a ten-year plan for the handling of
63
liquid and solid wastes for its service regions.
Despite the imminence of Michigan's growing energy problems, the
Michigan Public Service Commission (PSC) has no policy or plan.
The Commission avoids planning ahead even where it clearly has
jurisdiction. For example, where significant dangers would attend the
ultra-high voltage lines which Detroit Edison proposed to run through
Washtenaw County,14 the PSC claimed that it had no jurisdiction over
6
power siting in Michigan, though the Attorney General disagreed. 1
It is difficult to comprehend how an agency can have or implement any
energy policy if it lacks control over power siting. Yet, when the PSC
finally recognized the energy problem sufficiently to begin seeking
legislation, it favored the "one-stop" power siting legislation 66 that
power companies desire since it is easier for them to concentrate their
influence and avoid environmental restrictions where only one decision
is made. With a number of decision "stops," it is easier for the environmental movement to make itself felt, and for it to delay unwise or
harmful power development.
Michigan has not sought to explore whether it has any powers that
might restrain the careless construction and placement of nuclear
power reactors.6 7 Exclusive reliance on the Atomic Energy Commission for this protection is risky in view of the AEC's dismal record
with respect to both safety and honesty. 68 The state should at least
inquire into the ability of power companies to assure public safety in
their development and construction of nuclear power plants.69
One reason for the absence of planning in this area is that it has
been relatively easy for the powerful combination of military,
industrial, and governmental interests,70 which favor the profitable
63 Maryland has adopted a ten-year plan for dealing with long-range utility planning. Each
year the Chairman of the Maryland Public Service Commission sends to the Maryland
Natural Resources Secretary a ten-year forecast. The Secretary then conducts siting studies
and prepares environmental impact reports. MD. ANN. CODE art. 78 § 54B (Cum. Supp.
1974).
" See note 72 and accompanying text in PART ONE of this article.
65 See note 73 and accompanying text in PART ONE of this article.
66 See note 75 and accompanying text in PART ONE of this article.
67 See notes 17, 19-21 and accompanying text in PART ONE of this article; note 69 and
accompanying text infra.
" See notes 18, 84-86 and accompanying text in PART ONE of this article.
69 See Detroit News, June 14, 1974, at 6A, col. 4.
70 For example, the Department of Defense is a major political supporter of the AEC, in
part because the Department of Defense's nuclear warheads are provided free of charge from
the AEC's separate budget. H. METZGER, THE ATOMIC ESTABLISHMENT 240 (1972). See also
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fission "rapid breeder" reactors, to block adoption of an open energy
research policy that would consider all alternatives. The Atomic
Energy Commission during President Nixon's tenure was able to
channel the great bulk of federal research funds into the development
of these extremely dangerous v" and unpromising breeders. Only limited
funds were put toward development of the cleaner and safer fusion
process, and almost no funds for solar energy and other possible power
sources were provided. 72 These latter sources are both cleaner and
less wasteful than the rapid breeder.73
In a similar situation, the Water Resources Commission has set out
what it describes as a set of "strategies" for dealing with the water
problems of the state,74 in addition to a State Water Pollution Control
Plan. 75 These documents purportedly cover many aspects of water
management and pollution control. There is reference to broad plans
and to coordinating mechanisms, as well as to many of the details of
effective administration. Nevertheless, it is not clear that these documents have in fact led to integrated planning. 76 Nor is it clear that the
agency's work is adequately linked to the fundamental environmental
problems discussed in Part One of this article. WRC's failure to plan
is confirmed by the fact that Michigan was compelled to amend its
water quality statutes in order to conform to the comprehensive planning requirements of the FWPCA. 71 WRC's awareness of its planning

Comment, The AEC Amendment: Temporary Licensing of Nuclear Reactors, 10 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 236 (1973), for a description of the procedures employed by the AEC to keep its
decision process closed.
71 See Morgan, Adequacy of PresentStandardsof RadiationExposure, 1 ENVIR. AFFAIRS
91 (1972); Wall Street J., Jan. 26, 1972, at I; Rodgers, Research and Corruption, The
Exxon-Nixon Axis, 218 NATION 11-16, (Jan. 5, 1974), summarizing efforts by the administration and the energy industry to suppress research in less profitable alternate sources of
energy.
72 For example, in 1973, President Nixon requested $182 million for fast breeder reactors,
$4 million for solar energy, $39 million for fusion research, and $3 million for magnetohydrodynamics. Letter on Energy from Natural Resources Defense Council, 1973, at 6.
73 Detroit Free Press, Mar. 4, 1973, at 14D, col. 1; N.Y. Times, June 21, 1972, at 18C, col.
3; id., Apr. 9, 1974, at 40M, col. 2; id., Apr. 23, 1974, at 24C, col. 1; id., Apr. 29, 1974, at
32C, col. 2; id., May 12, 1974, at 1C, col. I.
74 MICH. DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION BRANCH,
STATE PLAN FOR AIR POLLUTION CONTROL, WATER POLLUTION CONTROL, SOLID WASTE
MANAGEMENT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1975 (June 1974).
75 MICH. WATER RESOURCES COMM'N, MICHIGAN STATE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL

PLAN (June, 1973).

71 See WRC Note, supra note 26, at 478, noting that although the WRC has issued a
Michigan State Water Pollution Control Plan (see note 75 supra), it is of questionable value.
For example, the Plan gives the Rouge River a very low priority for pollution control, despite
the findings of the Nader Task Force Report (D. ZWICK& M. BENSTOCK, WATER WASTELAND
193-94 (1971)) that the Rouge River is one of the ten most heavily polluted rivers in the United
States.
7 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (Supp. 1972).
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inadequacies is underlined by the fact that it recommended the various
1972-1973 amendments to the legislature."8
Unfortunately, even when the state's environment officials purport
to plan, their focus appears to remain on special interests rather than
on broad public goals.
For example, the previously discussed79 plan to save the Pigeon
River natural and wilderness areas from the oil and gas industry and
other destructive forces was totally inadequate. Despite some DNR
efforts, including the appointment of a Pigeon River Advisory
Council, 0 the citizens' group involved in the matter [Pigeon River
Country Association] demonstrated that DNR's management plan was
vague and that it lacked clear provisions for protection of the area or
enforcement of regulations. 8 ' Indeed, the plan did not deal with many
of the basic problems at issue, particularly guarding against the
intrusion of motorized vehicles and oil drilling. 2 The problem could
be a conceptual inability to plan, but since these shortcomings had
been brought to DNR's attention, the problem is more likely to be due
to special interest pressures. DNR claimed that it was attempting to
work out an agreement with the oil and gas companies. But such agreements would have permitted-not barred-drilling, and the DNR
delays may have contributed to the McClure Oil Company's ability to
get a permit to drill in Pigeon River country. Although the permit
grant was later overturned by the National Resources Commission
(NRC), McClure is now challenging that decision.8 3 The litigation
expense may be too burdensome for the public conservationists who
84
oppose this drilling, and McClure may well win as a result.
DNR's controversial proposal to build a harbor on the Platte River
provides another illustration of administrative inadequacy. DNR
argued that the harbor was needed because it was too dangerous for
small craft to fish in the open bay. When public opposition forced
abandonment of the harbor plan, DNR ironically proceeded to develop
an elaborate scheme to plant more salmon in the Platte Bay. The
practical effect will be to increase small-craft use of the open bay,85

"IAs a practical matter, the WRC (via DNR) not only recommended increased statutory
penalties, WRC Note, supra note 26, at 463, but recommended all the 1972-1973 amendments
needed to forestall federal intervention, including statutory language authorizing "comprehensive planning."
19 See notes 145-150 and accompanying text in PART ONE of this article.
so Mich. Department of Natural Resources News Bull. 1-2, May 16, 1974.
11 North Woods Call, Oct. 24, 1973, at 1, 5.
82 Id.
13 Mich. Oil Co. v. Natural Resources Comm'n, Dkt. No. 74-16638 (June 11, 1974).
14 North Woods Call, Aug. 21, 1974, at 1.
15 North Woods Call, Jan. 9, 1974, at 1; Id., Apr. 3, 1974, at 1, 5.
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but now that DNR's focus has changed, the agency has chosen to
ignore the danger to small craft.
The Public Service Commission (PSC) Chairman's proposal that
the federal government guarantee loans by Michigan's public utilities
evidences more than ill-considered planning. 8 The idea was very
similar to the federal government's guaranty of loans for the Lockheed
and the Penn Central companies and was duly criticized on similar
grounds. The chief objection, however, is that such a plan is really an
admission that no adequate plan existed in the first place. The solution
to Penn Central's difficulties lay in the development of a sound
national transportation policy. In the case of Lockheed, the guaranty
served as a poor substitute for the improvement of federal management
of large contracts in general. 87 Similarly, the PSC guarantee proposal
fails to recognize the need for the development of a sound energy
policy for Michigan public utilities.
Michigan highway construction activity also suffers from inadequate planning. The Highway Department recently admitted that,
despite various federal and state requirements, and the Department's
claims to the contrary, it had not yet begun a serious inquiry into the
impacts of social, economic, and environmental factors upon its transportation proposals. 8
There are few indications that planning has been any better at the
regional or urban level than at the state level. This may be due, in
part, to the Governor's support for such efforts in their initial stages
followed by his failure to act when funds or resources are actually
needed. For example, the Governor's office appointed a capable, highlevel task force to examine some of Michigan's regional problems, but,
as previously noted," when the task force suggested a number of sensible and public-oriented proposals such as the creation of a strong
regional planning office, its report was quietly filed away.
Despite the weakness of regional planning organizations such as the
Southeast Michigan Transportation Authority, whose limitations are
suggested by the Authority's claim that it need not consider environmental issues because it is a "planning" and not a "construction"
agency, 0 the Detroit metropolitan region has received little help. In

86 Detroit News, June 2, 1974, at 8G, col. i.
'

N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1972, at 33, col. 1.

88 MSEC News Letter, Oct. 21, 1974.

11 See note 219 in PART ONE of this article. This task force was set up by Governor
Romney, who had on occasion urged broad gauge, planned approaches to urban problems
which found little acceptance in the rest of the Republican party.
90 Jackson, Planning for Environmental Improvement in Southeast Michigan 46 (seminar
paper on file at Wayne State University Law School).
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addition to the effects of sorely inadequate funding grants by the
state, the city has had to suffer the consequences of poor environmental
planning. Furthermore, while public transportation is an area -where
the need for planning is particularly obvious, transit thinking and
planning have been "almost nonexistent." 91
The difficulty does not appear to be that the government of Michigan
lacks planning resources. The state has access to many public-oriented
plans and studies, ranging from the Ralls Energy Study92 to the T.O.P.
Task Force study of regionalism in Michigan.9 3 The problem is how
to persuade the government and the people of the importance of broad
planning. Citizens certainly should not have to resort to court action
to compel agency staff to think or to plan.
In areas such as land use, where the need for planned management
has been particularly keen, countervailing industry forces have caused
agency inaction. Chairman Phillip Mastin of the House Committee on
Towns and Counties held a series of hearings on land use patterns in
Michigan in 1972 and 1973.1' He found that developers, speculators,
land owners, and local authorities exercise little restraint in the conversion of farms, scenic areas, and wildlife refuges to areas of commercial and residential development. Representative Mastin suggested
that continued development of rural land into new residential communities could kill tourism and agriculture and cripple Michigan's economy by 1990 unless the trend was reversed by the implementation of
an appropriate statewide land use policy.95
The Governor summarized the situation in a statement to the
legislature:
We have unregulated urban and suburban spread and sprawl.
We have regressive tax laws which force conversion of prime
agricultural and forest lands to more temporarily profitable, but
in the long run undesirable, intensive uses. Unwise subdivision
development continues, aided by loopholes in the state's Subdivision Control Act. Our wetlands are inadequately protected
and flood plains are still being utilized for improper development.
As yet, we have not solved the problem of solid waste disposal
sites and our state tools for enforcing appropriate solutions to the
solid waste dilemma are inadequate. Finally, we are faced with a
91 Detroit News, Jan. 5, 1973, at 14A, col. I.

Testimony by William Rails, a Michigan Public Service Commissioner, in Hearingson
S.2176, Comm. on Interior and InsularAffairs, Before the U.S. House of Representatives,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 913-27 (1973).
93 STATE T.O.P. "THE OPTION PROCESS" TASK FORCE REPORT, Jan. 31, 1973. The report
grew out of a conference of federal, state and local officials in Detroit in 1972.
" See note 97 infra.
" Detroit News, Feb. 11,1974, at 17A.
92
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hodge-podge of confusing, overlapping and often conflicting
planning and zoning laws applicable at different levels of
government.9 6
This clear need for land use planning and management led to a
number of efforts to fill current voids. A Subcommittee on Land
Utilization of the Governor's Advisory Council for Environmental
Quality released a report in August, 1970, that recognized unplanned
land use as a major problem and emphasized the need for speedy corrective action. 97 The report called for the establishment of a state land
use policy and a review of land assessment and taxation practices.9 8
The Governor then created a Special Commission on Land Use in
October, 1970, whose final report recommended that the state develop
and implement a comprehensive land management program.9 9 Included were suggestions for (a) the creation of a state land use agency
to review all land use programs, (b) the requirement that all counties
prepare and adopt comprehensive land use plans, (c) the strengthened
enforcement of state and local laws, (d) the modification of property
tax laws to emphasize actual use rather than potential development
value, (e) a move away from reliance on local property taxation, (f)
broadened state authority to control development, (g) an inventory of
significant mineral deposits for inclusion in the state land use policy,
and (h) the development of a state solid waste management and disposal plan.' 0
The Special Commission on Land Use then proposed legislation and
held nine public hearings. Partly as a result of the fact that the public
was not well informed about these proposals, developer attitudes
dominated the hearings. 1°1 As a consequence of the real estate lobby's
vocal opposition to the very notion of land use planning, the Governor
temporarily shelved the proposal in a January 8, 1973, statement
which continued to emphasize its importance.'
Thereafter, the Governor, by Executive Order 1973-2,103 established an Office of Land Use in the DNR as a nucleus for the ultimate
development of a state land use program. 4 In the meantime, Repre96 Governor's Special Message to the Legislature on Land Use Planning and Management,
Nov. 6, 1973, at 3.
91 GUNN, A HISTORY OF LAND LEGISLATION IN MICHIGAN, PREPARED BY THE MICHIGAN
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DEMOCRATIC STAFF, Jan. 4, 1974.
98 Id.
99 Id. See also REPORTOF GOVERNOR MILLIKEN'S SPECIAL COMMISSION ON LAND USE, Dec.

14, 1971.
100See note 97 supra.
101Id.
102Id.
103 January I1, 1973, as modified by Exec. Order 1973-2a, March 13, 1973.
104 Executive Order 1973-2, which placed the office in DNR rather than leaving it in the
Governor's office, considerably lowered the status and the potential role of the program.
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sentative Mastin drafted and introduced legislation to provide for a
state land use commission, a state land use plan, and for various
elements necessary for such a program." °5 This bill had several significant omissions, including the failure to come to grips with urban
land use problems. °6 The omissions were, in part, the result of a
tactical decision. 10 7 Unfortunately, this concession proved insufficient.
The Governor expressed his support for the bill on several
occasions, 0 8 but he made no extended effort to explain the problems
involved to the public, nor to counteract the lobbying campaign of the
real estate interests. Determined leadership could have helped the
public to see the importance of a sensible land use policy. Unfortunately, the bill was never passed. 0 9
While the Land Use Commission and Representative Mastin did
raise some of the basic land use planning issues previously neglected
in Michigan, the results of their efforts are not encouraging. Nor is
there much encouragement to be found in the contribution to
integrated land management in recently enacted Michigan land use
legislation. H.B. 4244110 was recently passed in order to relieve somewhat the basic land use problem of undue reliance on the regressive
property tax,"' which tended to accelerate speculative development of
farm and open space land." 2 But H.B. 4244 is more an illustration of
Michigan's inadequate perspectives and lack of planning than a
monument to integrated land reform. The law provides certain tax
incentives for retaining land for agricultural or open space purposes.
These incentives, however, are more likely to serve as a windfall for
a limited number of land owners, and the act will thus fail to serve
the goals of proper land use." 3 What is necessary is a statewide plan
for the management of all land, together with appropriate management
powers to assure that open space and farmland are preserved. While
H.B. 4244 might conceivably provide enough time for effective land

See GUNN supra note 97; H.B. 5055 (6097), 77th Legis. (1974).
106 For detailed critiques of H. B. 5055 (6097)'s provisions at various stages of its legislative
1o5

career, see Earth Beat, Sept. 14, 1973, at 1, 2; id., Dec. 7, 1973, at 2; id., Feb. 8, 1974, at 1,2;
North Woods Call, Aug. 29, 1973, at 3; id., Oct. 10, 1973, at 1, 5; id., Mar. 13, 1974, at 7.
107 The Governor's Special Commission on Land Use largely omitted the urban environmental side of the problem from its Dec. 14, 1971, Report.
108

See GUNN, supra note 97.

109H.B. 6097 (5055) was referred back to committee, and died in committee on June 20,
1974. Earth Beat, July 12, 1974, at 2.
110 No. 116 [1974] Mich. Pub. Acts 265.
111 See note 96 and accompanying text supra.
12 Id. See Note, PreferentialProperty Tax Treatment of Farmland and Open Space
Under Michigan Law, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 428 (1975).

113 See Note, supra note 112.
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use legislation to be enacted, the extraordinary level of profit made in
speculative development renders such a possibility unlikely.'14
The final portion of this section concerns the effects of economic
growth claims on agencies which have not developed adequate plans
to implement environmental laws. These agencies are more susceptible
to industry pressures because of the absence of long-range management
plans.
For example, the PSC's limited evaluation of energy rates, energy
research, and energy advertising policies, and the Commission's failure
to examine energy alternatives, clearly point to its lack of planning.
Without the protection afforded by a state energy policy, the public is
unable to defend the environment against uncontested claims of
economic growth. Thus, the townspeople in Midland, Michigan,
strongly support a proposed Midland nuclear plant because of the
ostensible job and development opportunities. This has been described
as the "selling" of the Midland plant by the Atomic Energy Commission, Dow Chemical, and Consumers Power." 5 Meanwhile, neither
the media nor local political leaders have adequately emphasized the
counterbalancing perils.
If another energy crisis occurs in the near future, it is likely that the
new oil industry target will be off-shore drilling for oil and gas in the
Great Lakes. Michigan will need adequate energy planning and strong
political leadership to resist this. The Governor has already suggested
that Great Lakes drilling might be acceptable," 6 though the policy of
the Governor' 17 and of the NRC 1 8 has been to deny leases for Great
Lakes oil and gas exploration. The Governor recently reaffirmed his
opposition to off-shore drilling,' 19 but did not really rule out offshore
drilling as pressures for production mount.
A frequently forwarded-and often successful-industry argument
in support of economic growth is that environmental safeguards are
too expensive or that the necessary technology is not presently
available. 2 ° The agencies often accept or even advance' 2' such argu-

1,4

Detroit Free Press, Jan. 23, 1972, at 3A, col. I.

,,5Richardson, The Selling of the Atom, 30 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 28 (Oct. 1974).

"1 Detroit Free Press, Dec. 14, 1969, at 6C, col. 1; North Woods Call, May 22, 1974, at 7.
,'7 The Governor's Special Message to the Michigan Legislature on the Environment,
Feb. 4, 1971, at 7, states a broad policy against permitting drilling near lakes and streams.
"8 MICH.
WATER RESOURCES COMM'N, WATER POLLUTION PROBLEMS AND CONTROL
PROGRAMS IN MICHIGAN'S PORTION OF THE GREAT LAKES, 6 (Nov. 1971).

..
9 Detroit News, Oct. 31, 1974, at 4B. See also Tuerkheimer, Copper Miningfrom Under
Lake Superior: The Legal Aspects, 7 NATURAL RESOURCES LAW. 137, 149-150 (1974).
120 See notes 121-132 and accompanying text infra.
12, See Detroit News, July 18, 1974, at 14D, col. 1; Detroit News, Dec. 1, 1974, at 8A, col.
I; note 78 and accompanying text in PART ONE of this article.
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ments as an excuse for their failure to enforce environmental laws.
Once again, this presents an opportunity for special interest pressures
to prevail when there is no countervailing advance planning. In the
Hillsdale Foundry example, 2' agency procrastination, flagrant conflicts of interest, and polluter recalcitrance contributed to the
MAPCC's acceptance of Hillsdale's claim that it could not afford air
pollution control devices.
The Peerless Cement' 2 3 and Reserve Mining Company 1 24 examples
present further instances of cost arguments meeting little resistance.
In the latter example, the company's claims that it could not afford
safeguards against the discharge of metal tailings and asbestos fibers
were devoid of support in the record at trial. 25 Similarly, Peerless
stood by its claims of inability to protect the public through environmental safeguards. Ironically, much of the company's resources
derived from tax-exempt bonds guaranteed by the City of Detroit.2 6
Even where a claim of excessive cost or insufficient technology can
be sustained, pollution is nevertheless considered in Michigan 2 7 to be
a cost of business (externality) that is passed on to the public, rather
than to the polluting industry. It is poor planning to allow an inefficient
business to survive only if the costs and burdens of its polluting activity
are borne by the public or if environmental standards are not enforced.
A related tactic used by industry in evading environmental measures
is to threaten localities with the loss or the withholding of jobs if
expensive safeguards are not foregone. But particular developments
or projects often produce many fewer jobs than their promoters claim.
Peerless Cement told the Detroit City Council that its new plant would
produce 300 jobs. 2 ' In reality, those jobs existed only during construction; afterwards, the plant provided less than half as many jobs.' 2 9
Cleveland Cliffs Iron talked glowingly of the creation of as many as
1,000 new jobs as an incentive for approval of the Tilden dam
project. 30 Upon completion of the dam, this claim proved unduly
optimistic because only about 200 permanent jobs were actually
filled."13 Once again, if an agency is armed with an environmental
See notes 76-83 and accompanying text in PART ONE of this article.
See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
124 N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1972, at 27C; Detroit Free Press, Sep. 29, 1972, at 7B, col. 1.
121 United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. II (D. Minn. 1974).
126 Detroit News, July 18, 1972, at IB, col. 3; id., Dec. 6, 1971, at IA, col. 1, and at 12A,
col. 1.
127 See part VI supra.
12s Detroit Free Press, Dec. 6, 1971, at 12A, col. 2; Detroit News, Oct. 15, 1971, at IA, col.
1; id., July 30, 1972, at 4B, col. 1.
122

122

129 Id.
130 Detroit Free Press, Apr. 10, 1972, at
131 See notes 126-127 and accompanying

2A.
text in PART ONE of this article.
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perspective and an effective plan, it need not be overwhelmed by
arguments about jobs and economic growth.
The pressures imposed where state efforts to assure environmental
protection are countered with arguments of prohibitive expense or
technical infeasibility are intensified when an industry threatens to
move to another state which has less extensive environmental safeguards. Considerations arise about the relationship between federal
and state efforts to resolve environmental problems. 132 One reason
that industry and the states may favor regional or national approaches
to particular environmental problems is to avoid such competitive
disadvantages.
A concluding observation concerning environmental planning bears
mentioning at this juncture. During the United Nations International
Conference on the Environment in June, 1972, it appeared that the
opposing groups could be accurately categorized as either optimists
or pessimists. The latter were primarily the environmentalists and
academicians, while the former seemed to include industrialists, market
economists, and bureaucrats. The optimists, therefore, are the group
that most heavily influences the decisionmaking system. They overemphasize economic growth and dismiss pessimism, even at the risk
of failing to acknowledge potentially productive contrary factors. The
public interest is excluded if it requires any restructuring of agency
priorities. Whether the result of bureaucratic anti-intellectualism or
feelings of inadequacy, the consequence is myopic administration.
VIII.

CLOSED DECISIONMAKING AND ITS EFFECT

ON URBAN AREAS: MICHIGAN'S NEGLECT OF DETROIT'S
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

Detroit's environmental difficulties are rarely mentioned in discussions of Michigan's environmental problems.13 ' While the urgency of
the urban plight often seems to outweigh problems of the fisheries or
open space, the decisionmaking process remains considerably less
sensitive to Detroit's predicament. The state continues to insist that
the automobile is not a significant source of air pollution in Michigan, 134 and it continues to ignore issues of transportation routes,
parking, and related land use planning. 135 The situation is exacerbated
by an inadequate air pollution strategy, which is premised upon indiSee part II in PART ONE of this article.
133 See interviews on file with author at Wayne State University Law School.
132

1 See notes 10-11 and 19-20 and accompanying text supra.
Id.

135
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vidualized penalties and incentives without any supporting plan."3 6
The efficacy of this limited strategy is further undermined by the with137
holding of individual penalties pending "voluntary compliance.'
Adequate public transportation and convenient recreation facilities
could be most helpful in dealing with instability and crime in the inner
city. Yet, both have suffered from an absence of fair and open
decisionmaking.
The regional agency which has been designated to serve Southeast
Michigan (the Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority) gives an equal
vote to each of the five participating counties, 138 despite the fact that.
Wayne County has the largest population, provides the greatest share
of the revenues, and demonstrates the most unfulfilled recreation
needs. The practical result of this deliberate bypassing of a "one manone vote" principle"19 is that the Huron-Clinton Authority is essentially
unresponsive to the needs of Detroit and Wayne County. The Authority
has yet to develop a single park, recreation, or open space facility
which is convenient to inhabitants of the inner city. The Authority has
thus confined the bulk of its activities to counties that provide a smaller
40
portion of the recreation funds.1
Detroit's inability to obtain public transportation is attributable to
a factor in closed decisionmaking previously considered at length 4 'the role of special interest pressures. The highway lobby, spearheaded
by the automobile industry, has helped to advance the argument that
Southeast Michigan (i.e., Detroit) might be "unduly benefited" by
mass transit expenditures. Measures to improve mass transit in Detroit
have been notoriously unsuccessful; many studies conclude that
42
Detroit has the poorest public transportation system in the nation.
One major weakness in Michigan's environmental management is
the splitting of integrated problems among ill-coordinated agencies,
combined with the use of such limited behavior modification techniques as monetary penalties and tax incentives.' 4' Accordingly, one
136 See part VI supra.

See notes 8-18 and accompanying text supra.
,38The counties are: Macomb, Monroe, Oakland, St. Clair, Washtenaw, and Wayne.
139 See note 221 and accompanying text in PART ONE of this article.
140 Id.
,4,See part IV C in PART ONE of this article.
142 Detroit Free Press, June 27, 1972, at 6A.
143 Litigation seeking to recover a portion of the 1973 two-cent increase in gasoline tax
collected from Detroit motorists on the grounds that this would be the source of 90 percent of
the Southeast Michigan Transportation Authority (SEMTA) budget, and that SEMTA would
not devote an appropriate portion of those receipts to Detroit's transit needs, ultimately
failed in the Michigan Supreme Court. County Road Comm'rs v. Canvassers, 391 Mich. 666,
218 N.W.2d 144 (1974). Related efforts to avoid the two-cent increase by a ballot referendum
were blocked by a series of political maneuvers. See County Road Commissioners v.
Canvassers, 391 Mich. 666, -N.W.2d--(1974), which held that No. 326, [1972] Mich. Pub.
137
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would expect that regional organization would provide a promising
and integrated approach to the sprawling problems of the Detroit
metropolitan area. But, as noted earlier, 4 4 the regional authorities in
recreation (Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority) and in transportation (SEMTA) have been unresponsive to Detroit's needs. Local
politicians fear that a regional body may not be receptive to their local
promotions and developments. Consequently, cities such as Troy have
refused to participate in the Southeast Michigan Council of Governments (SEMCOG). 145 From the inner city perspective, blacks who have
finally achieved political control may view regional efforts with
suspicion.
The schism is further widened by the distrust that exists between
environmentalists and leaders of movements designed to assist indigent
and minority groups. Many such leaders feel that the environmental
movement is merely a diversion from their own embattled efforts to
survive and that the environment offers a slogan behind which wealthy
suburbanites can exclude any development that might help the black
146
or the poor.
But these groups share a common goal that is currently being
thwarted by the obstacles to effective participation in the decisionmaking process. All represent nonproductivity-oriented public interests and, as such, they lack political and economic power. Thus, unless
the decisionmaking process is made more accessible to them, the vital
interests represented by these groups will continue to go unheeded.
IX.

CONCLUSION

Parts One and Two of this analysis have sought to document in
detail the relationship between closed patterns of decisionmaking and
Michigan's current environmental problems. A breakdown of the
factors behind the failures of state environmental management provides a convenient framework within which to examine Michigan's
environmental record of the past few years. The question remains,
however, as to how to explain the underlying form and flow of this
environmental process.
One possible explanation is that the environmental crisis presents
Acts had raised gasoline in pari materia with No. 327, [1972] Mich. Pub. Acts, and that the
former, as an appropriation act, could not be the subject of a ballot referendum.
144 Detroit Free Press, Dec. 2, 1972, at 2A; Detroit News, Apr. 18, 1974, at 17A, col. 8.
,45 Detroit News, June 19, 1974, at lB.
146 Christman, Ecology Is a Racist Shuck, SCANLAN'S MAGAZINE 47-49 (Aug. 1970);
Lanning, The Environment, The Poor and The Black (speech delivered at environmental
roundtable, American Association of Law Schools Convention, December 1973) (on file with
author at Wayne State University Law School).
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a classic choice between individual satisfaction and the goals that
benefit a larger community. However, the environment may be about
to force a more elemental choice upon us: economic growth or survival.
The consequences of such a potentially drastic choice may be that
the American propensity for compromise will give way to the necessity
for strong leadership in this area. Selection of candidates on a merit
and leadership basis may obviate, for example, many of the environmental failings attributable to Michigan's lack of a strong executive.
Similarly, a broader public recognition of the immediate value of
retaining land resources may evoke more forceful reactions to individual environmental assaults.
The agencies and the government of the State of Michigan have
tried to get by with a maximum of bold words and with a minimum of
necessary action that would limit productivity and growth. The major
difference between the state's neglect of the inner city and its response
to environmental disaster is that, while people in Detroit continue to
suffer, they still lack the leadership and political power necessary to
obtain a meaningful improvement in their situation. The next environmental disaster, on the other hand, may penetrate to the suburbs and
to the seats of decision. Real shortages of basic resources, energy, or
drinking water will hit home. If the imminence of this situation is to
be impressed upon the people, every level of government must become
involved in an open and responsive process of decisionmaking. That
goal may seem distant, but the stakes are not inconsiderable.

